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Abstract 
Using Norwegian survey data (n = 4116), we study couples‟ likelihood of pooling their 
economic resources. The proportion of cohabitation compared to marriages is high in 
Norway. Over the last decades, tax policy and the social security system have moved towards 
equating cohabitation with marriage. Our knowledge of the economic organization of the two 
types of couples is, however, rather imperfect. Our main hypothesis is that cohabitants are 
less likely to pool their economic resources than married couples, but that this difference is 
less if they hold plans to marry. We take into account important factors that largely have been 
ignored in many earlier studies, namely the presence of children and the duration of the 
relationship. The results confirm our hypothesis but also show that the difference between 
cohabitants and married couples is reduced once these important factors are controlled for. 
Implications for policy are discussed. 
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The aim of the present study is to establish whether married and cohabiting couples to the 
same degree are pooling their economic resources, or whether there are notable differences 
between the two types of unions in this respect. 
Over the course of the last few decades, co-residential couple relationships have 
become far more diverse, with a rapidly increasing proportion of heterosexual cohabitation as 
the major change.  Another major societal change that has occurred in the same period is the 
shift from the male breadwinner model to a model of a dual earner family. Since more women 
are now economically independent, the question of how the couple‟s finances are divided and 
managed, gains more interest, compared to a situation where husbands are sole providers of 
their families. Norway is one of the countries where these changes have been most profound. 
 The economic organisation of the household is a very important facet of the day-to-
day lives of co-residential couples. The management of economic resources is important for 
basic provisions to the members of the family, but it is also connected to a range of other 
issues, including, but not limited to, the distribution of power within the household and the 
production of gender inequalities (Kenney 2006; Vogler 1998). 
Most previous studies of income organization in couple relationships have only 
studied married couples, but recently more studies have emerged emphasizing cohabitating 
couples (Elizabeth 2001; Hamplova and Le Bourdais 2009; Heimdal and Houseknecht 2003; 
Yodanis and Lauer 2007b). As cohabitation becomes more widespread, more countries may 
wish to introduce legal regulations for cohabitation. In Norway, the rights and obligations of 
cohabitants have gradually been taken into the jurisdiction. Cohabitants do not, however, have 
a mutual duty to provide for each other as the Norwegian Marriage Act imposes on married 
partners. In public law areas like pensions, social security and taxes, the most marriage-like 
unions (i.e., those that have lasted for more than two years or where the partners have 
common children) have, however, attained a legal status that is virtually equal to that of 
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married couples (Noack 2001). An important argument for these comprehensive changes has 
been a general sense of justice and the fear of a legislation that in some situations could make 
cohabitation more economically profitable and thereby threaten the legitimacy of the 
established welfare and taxation arrangements. But if cohabitants pool their economic 
resources to a lesser degree than married couples, a more equal treatment of cohabitation and 
marriage in public law may have unintended, and possibly negative, consequences at the 
individual level. It is thus important to increase our knowledge of couples‟ money 
management, in particular for the development of acceptable social policies. 
Using a sample representative of young Norwegians, we contribute to the literature by 
studying pooling of economic resources, defined as having joint bank accounts and seeking 
the consent and advice of the partner before doing larger purchases, in married and cohabiting 
couples. We distinguish between cohabiting couples with and without marriage intentions and 
take into account confounding factors that were ignored in earlier studies. The Norwegian 
context provides a particularly interesting research setting for this study, as Norway is one of 
the forerunners in the development of cohabitation and out-of-wedlock fertility.  
 
 
THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH  
The degree to which couples pool their economic resources is likely to be affected by a wide 
range of factors. Any difference in the prevalence of pooling of economic resources between 
cohabitants and married couples might be generated by a range of different mechanisms. 
One possible causal mechanism is that social norms on what is appropriate in each of 
the two types of relationship motivate the partners to organize their income differently. The 
normative context of marriage is different from that of cohabitation, and marital partners 
would be expected to pool their economic resources to a larger degree than cohabitants. With 
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increasing individualization, social class, gender and family ties are supposed to have less 
binding force upon the behaviour of individuals. Cohabitation, which often is seen as a more 
individualistic and less institutionalized family form (Cherlin 2004; Lewis 2001), represents 
both a break from and a continuation of marriage. On the one hand, cohabitation implies less 
norms, obligations and formal ties and hence more independence. On the other hand 
cohabitation also implies a wish of commitment to one another. Cohabitating couples balance 
ties versus independence. According to Singh and Lindsay (1996), „cohabitation money‟ is 
characterised by separateness, accountability and calculation, whereas „marriage money‟ is 
characterised by being joint, co-operative and nebulous. Vogler (2005:12) describes money 
management systems where money are kept separate as „privatised systems where goods and 
services are exchanged on the basis of market-like relationships‟. 
 Studies that use representative samples to compare income organisation of married 
and cohabiting couples are few in number. Evidence from different countries tells us, 
however, that cohabiting couples are less inclined to pool their resources than married couples 
(Hamplova and Le Bourdais 2009; Heimdal and Houseknecht 2003; Knudsen and Wærness 
2009; Vogler, Brockmann, and Wiggins 2006; Winkler 1997; Yodanis and Lauer 2007a). All 
these studies include some controls for potential confounders, such as age and income, but do 
not provide evidence that the difference can be given a causal interpretation. It is likely that 
also various selection mechanisms contribute to any remaining difference between cohabiting 
couples and married couples.  
The most prominent possible selection mechanism is a relationship duration effect. As 
time goes by, the couple will most likely make small, joint investments, and this will make 
pooling more natural than keeping money separate. In other words, the economic lives of the 
partners are getting increasingly intertwined over time, and the couple thus accumulates 
“jointness” in their economic dispositions, even though they did not plan to pool resources at 
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the start of the union. Income pooling seems to be somewhat more likely among cohabitants 
in long-term relationships (Winkler 1997), and this may, for example, be due to the 
development of   greater trust between the partners (Heimdal and Houseknecht 2003). Unions 
that have lasted longer will thus have higher tendency to pooling than unions that have lasted 
for a short period of time. 
This process can be looked at from a transaction cost economics perspetice, which 
would say that long-term relationships and relationships where the partners have invested 
heavily in the relationship will tend to pool money because this reduces the costs of 
transactions within households (Treas 1993). 
In a context like contemporary Norway, where most unions start as cohabitation, the 
average relationship duration for a random sample of married couples will be higher than the 
average relationship duration for a random sample of cohabiting couples. Thus, by comparing 
the economic organization of married couples with that of cohabiting couples, one will 
necessarily pick a component that is due to the married couples‟ longer relationship durations.  
Combined with the fact that the duration of cohabitation is on average much shorter than 
marriage, this concern implies that potential differences in money management between 
married and cohabiting couples in part may be due to the shorter duration of the latter. 
Several other characteristics of the relationship and the partners can be expected to 
influence whether couples pool their economic resources. Household income will obviously 
influence economic dispositions, and possibly the degree to which partners are pooling 
resources. It is, however, important to distinguish between income as a measure of total 
resources of the household, and income as a measure of the relative power of the partners. As 
to the first perspective, the importance of household income is unclear. One possibility is that 
high income facilitates separate accounts because the couple can afford it, another is that high 
income facilitate pooling because there is less need to budget carefully (Treas 1993). As to the 
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second perspective, economic bargaining models of households suggest that the outcome of 
negotiations over the allocation of housework and money in households, is heavily influenced 
by the financial resources each partner controls (Halleröd 2005; Lundberg and Pollak 1996; 
Winkler 1997). Studies that have included measures of partners‟ relative economic power 
report that independent management systems (keeping money separate) were most likely to be 
used by couples where one of the partners earned more than the other, while joint pooling of 
income was more likely when both partners had approximately equal income (Vogler, 
Brockmann, and Wiggins 2006). A quantitative study of separate financial arrangement of 
Japanese wives, report some, but not unconditional, support for the transaction cost 
hypothesis (Ono and Luoh 2003). 
With increasing age, the partners will have more experience managing personal 
finances. This may lead them to pursue certain strategies of economic organisation, but the 
empirical evidence is not unanimous in this respect. Heimdal and Houseknecht (2003) find 
that elderly couples are more likely to keep money separate in the United States but that there 
is no such effect in Sweden. Treas (1993) also reports that elderly American married couples 
are more likely to have separate accounts. Vogler et al. (2006) report no effect of age for 
British couples (both married and cohabiting), but find that elderly male partners are less 
likely to practice independent money management. Married couples are, on average, older 
than cohabitants, so age might also be a confounder for the effect of union type on the 
likelihood of pooling economic resources. 
A family‟s economic dispositions are bound to change dramatically once they have a 
child together. Children need food, clothing and care, and births may change the employment 
situation of both partners. Thus, having a common child should represent a causal mechanism 
affecting money management. Any difference in pooling by couple‟s parity status should not, 
however, be attributed wholly to such a causal mechanism, as it is definitely not random who 
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chooses to have a child: The decision to have a child might be the outcome of having a well-
functioning cohabiting relationship and making plans to get married.  
Both common children and children from prior relationships (“step-children”) are 
likely to affect the pooling of economic resources also through selection, as, theoretically, 
common children increase the likelihood of pooling, because children can be seen as a joint 
investment and reducing the risk of a break-up (Treas 1993). An important question is 
whether there is a distinction between common children and children from earlier 
relationships in this respect. On the one hand, having children from earlier unions is likely to 
affect the economic decision-making, but on the other hand, children brought into the 
household from one of the partners‟ earlier relationships may not represent the same kind of 
investment in the transaction economics sense of Treas (1993). A study of qualitative data 
reported that those with prior relationship experience were more likely to keep money 
separate, plausibly due to the presence of children from previous unions (Burgoyne and 
Morison 1997). Thus, it is not clear what effect on money management of children from 
earlier relationships. While finding no effect of having children for married couples, Vogler et 
al. (2006) report that cohabiting parents are more similar to married couples than to 
cohabiting couples without children concerning the management of money within the 
household, i.e. they are more likely to jointly pool income. Winkler (1997) reports that 
income pooling is more likely among cohabiting couples when they have a biological child, 
but her analysis do not include married couples. Recently, Hamplova and Le Bourdais (2009) 
reported that the difference in the likelihood of pooling between married and cohabiting 
couples to some extent is moderated by the presence of children in Denmark, France and the 
United States. 
 
The diversity of cohabiting couples in Norway 
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Cohabiting couples is a very heterogeneous group (Thornton, Axinn, and Xie 2007). 
Although cohabitation as a prelude before marriage has become typical behaviour in many 
countries and in this respect may be apprehended as a part of the marriage process, this is 
obviously not the perception of all cohabitants. Manning and Smock (2002) remind us that 
marriage intentions are certainly not universal among cohabitants, and for those who do not 
expect to marry, cohabitation may be more appropriately perceived as an alternative to 
marriage or living alone. Irrespective of whether marriage intentions among cohabitants are 
fulfilled or not these intentions may be used as indicators for different types of cohabitation. 
Generally, cohabitants who plan to marry seem to be far more like married people than those 
who express less precise or no intentions at all (Brown 2003; Brown and Booth 1996; Wiik, 
Bernhardt, and Noack 2009). A study of Norwegian couples reported such differences for 
various socioeconomic variables and relationship assessments, such as the seriousness of their 
relationship and whether they have considered dissolving it (Wiik, Bernhardt, and Noack 
2009). It has also been found that the relationship assessments of cohabitants expecting to 
marry their partner are not measurably different from those of married couples in the United 
States (Brown and Booth 1996). Taken together, these findings suggest that cohabitants' 
assessments of their relationships likely influence their union outcomes. When studying how 
married and cohabiting couples organize their income, we therefore analyse two different 
groups of cohabitants, those with marriage intentions and those without such intentions. 
In Norway, cohabitation seems to be more marriage-like than in most other countries. 
According to a typology deduced from a cross-national study of  seventeen countries 
(Heuveline and Timberlake 2005), Sweden has reached a final stage where cohabitation is 
nearly indistinguishable from marriage. Although Norway was not included in this study, it is 
reasonable to believe that Norway would be categorized in about the same manner (Wiik, 
Bernhardt, and Noack 2009). Therefore, one would expect smaller differences between 
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cohabitants and married couples in Norway than in most other countries also with respect to 
how couples organize their finances. Nonetheless, cohabiting couples have higher dissolution 
rates and lower degrees of commitment than married couples (Poortman and Lyngstad 2007; 
Wiik, Bernhardt, and Noack 2009). If cohabiting couples forgo marriage because they want 
an easy way out of the relationship (or they do not trust their partner to stay), the couple‟s 
willingness to integrate their finances with those of the other partner should be lower. It is 
likely that integrated finances represent a practical and possibly also a mental “barrier” to 
dissolving the relationship. 
 
Hypotheses 
Considering all the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence from the existing literature, 
we arrive at a set of four hypotheses on the relationship between marital status and pooling of 
economic resources. First, we expect that (Hypothesis 1) cohabiting couples, ceteris paribus, 
are more inclined to keep money separate than married couples, but that this difference is 
smaller for cohabiting couples with marriage intentions (Hypothesis 2). Second, we will test 
whether the duration of the union reduces the discrepancy between the two types of 
cohabiting and married couples (Hypothesis 3). Finally, we will examine the role of children 
in the household by testing the hypothesis that couples with children are more likely to pool 
their resources than couples without children (Hypothesis 4). In the following sections, we 
will test these hypotheses using Norwegian nationally representative survey data. 
 
 
DATA AND METHOD 
The Sample 
11 
 
We analyze data derived from The New Families Survey conducted by Statistics Norway in 
2003. This is a survey of a nationally representative random sample of the non-immigrant 
population (i.e. men and women with at least one Norwegian-born parent). The sample was 
drawn directly from the Norwegian central population register. This means that the sample is 
representative of the Norwegian non-immigrant population in the appropriate age ranges. At 
the time of the survey, the women were aged 20-44 and the men were aged 23-47. The reason 
for the staggered age ranges is men‟s slightly postponed family behaviour. The response rate 
was 63.3 % which is as expected for a survey of this design, where questionnaires are sent by 
post. Of the net sample of 6317 individuals, 4419 individuals were living in either married of 
cohabiting unions. After excluding cases with missing values, we are left with 4116 
observations. 
The survey data were supplemented with data from administrative registers maintained 
by Statistics Norway. For more information on this type of data, see Røed and Raaum (2003) 
Additional information on income, fertility and education was linked to the survey data. 
Provided that the respondents give their consent, such linking of data is facilitated through a 
system of personal ID numbers. By returning the questionnaire, survey respondents also 
agreed to the linking of register data to the survey data, thus no further non-response was 
incurred at this point.  
 
Measure of pooling of economic resources 
We use two criteria to define our dependent variable measuring whether the partners are 
pooling their economic resources or not. First, to be defined as pooling their resources the 
couple must have a common bank account. This criterion was measured by a simple survey 
question, which wording was “Do you and your partner have a common bank account?” 
Hence, we do not know from the responses whether this is a savings account or an account 
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used in day to day household management. Nor do we know whether both have equal access 
to the account. However, having a common bank account indicates that they, at least for a 
proportion of their expenses or savings, consider themselves as one economic unit. In some 
countries, opening a bank account is associated with rather large fees, but in Norway most 
banks have no fees or take account fees that are negligible in this context. 
The second criterion considers the insight each partner has into the consumption and 
other economic behaviour of the other partner. For a couple to pass this criterion, the 
responding partner must report that both partners always consult the other before doing 
purchases costing more than 2000 NOK (approx. USD 300). One problem with this definition 
of pooling is that all information is collected from one of the two partners. Hence, lack of 
accurate knowledge or erroneous beliefs about the other partner‟s behaviour may influence 
the respondent‟s answer. 
To summarize, the dependent variable is operationalized as follows: respondents with 
a common bank account and reporting that themselves as well as their partner always seek the 
advice of the other partner before doing larger purchases are defined as poolers. Respondents 
who only fulfil one or none of the two criteria mentioned are defined as non-poolers. Poolers 
are coded 1 on the dummy variable. According to this indicator, poolers amount to 44 per cent 
of the sample. 
Despite the mentioned shortcomings, which to a large degree also characterize the 
other studies of this topic, we argue that our measure will be sufficiently precise for our 
purposes. Constructing an ideal measure of income pooling is probably not possible, and even 
more difficult with the advent of electronic money like credit cards (Pahl 1999).  
We can compare our definition and results to the definitions used and results obtained in other 
studies, for example Knudsen & Wærness‟ (2009, henceforth K&W) study of Norwegian 
couples using ISSP data. K&W operate with a stricter definition of pooling than we. The so-
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called genuine joint poolers both pool all income and keep equally account of the regular 
expenses and the family economy as a whole. They find that 24 per cent of the couples were 
genuine joint poolers, which is markedly lower than our result. The reasons the discrepancy 
include, but are not limited to, K&W‟s requirement that partners keep equal account of the 
family finances to be counted as poolers, and this is a stricter criterion than our definition. In 
addition, our estimate is probably higher than the K&W estimate because our definition 
(having a common bank account and seeking advice when doing purchases) does not 
necessarily mean that the household pools all income. A final important reason for the 
different results is that our study is restricted to young couples while the other studies are not. 
It can also be argued that the distinction between “poolers” and “non-poolers” is too 
simplistic. The “non-poolers” include a various situations, such as partners with separate bank 
accounts that seek each other‟s advice before doing large purchases and couples that have 
common bank accounts (for commodity reasons) but do as they please with their money. 
Here, we have chosen to follow the literature on dividing couples into “poolers” and “non-
poolers”. The most recent studies on this topic (e.g. Hamplova and Le Bourdais 2009) make 
use of this distinction. A more fine-grained definition of the dependent variable would 
increase the model complexity. We have, however, experimented with OLS regressions on an 
index of the degree of pooling with a score from 0 to 5. Two points was added for a joint bank 
account and one or two points added for each spouse‟s asking for advice usually or always. 
Results from this exercise were close to substantively identical to the set of results obtained 
with the logit model on the dichotomous dependent variable. Thus, we conclude that we are 
not hiding any important patterns by choosing the dichotomy over a constructed index. 
We do not maintain that our operationalization of income pooling is ideal. Pooling of 
income does not necessarily imply that both keep exactly the same account of the household 
finances. Partners may for example divide the responsibility for day-to-day purchases and 
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financial decisions. More substantial decisions should, however, imply participation from 
both partners. When results of determinants of pooling are compared across studies, the 
pattern shown in our analyses is compatible with those reported by Knudsen and Wærness 
(2009) and Hamplova and Le Bourdais (2009). This is at least an indication of the different 
definitions tapping into the same latent variable: the degree of economic intertwining of the 
two partners and their dispositions. 
 
Measures of independent and control variables 
 Our main independent variable is union type, i.e. whether the respondent is currently 
cohabiting or married. In addition, we use a question about marriage intentions among 
cohabiting respondents. From these questions a three-category variable is constructed, 
separating between (1) cohabitants with intent to marry within the next two years, (2) 
cohabitants without specific marriage intentions and (3) married respondents. 
 There are several other factors that may influence both a couples‟ choice of union type 
and their economic organization. To increase the comparability of the cohabiting and married 
couples, we include two sets of control variables: One with indicators of the couple‟s 
socioeconomic resources and potential, and one with characteristics of their relationship. 
The first set of control variables includes education, household income, age and 
gender. Both his and her educational levels are included as variables in the regression model. 
Respondents‟ highest educational attainment was assessed by the use of register information 
at the end of the year of interview, while the partner‟s education was reported by the 
respondent in the survey. Both variables are coded as categorical variables with six levels 
ranging from primary education to a graduate degree. Gross annual income before taxes and 
transfers in the year before the survey was reported by the respondent for him-/herself as well 
as for the partner in seven categories from 'less than 100 000 NOK' to '500 000 NOK and 
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over'. We control for partners‟ incomes by including main effects of both his and her annual 
income and an interaction effect. Cohabitants tend to be younger than married couples. We 
therefore included the average age of the respondent and his/her partner as a continuous 
regressor.  
 An important point is that we also control for the respondent‟s gender. Since our data 
are based on reports from only one of the partners there is a possibility that male and female 
respondents do not report equally concerning the dependent variable. By controlling for 
gender, however, this potential bias is taken care of. In the case of no reporting bias by 
gender, the parameter for this dummy variable will not be measurably different from zero in 
the analyses. 
Turning to the second set of control variables, relationship characteristics, an 
important variable is the duration of the union in calendar years, measured from the 
establishment of the joint household (when the partners moved together). This means that the 
duration of the union for cohabitants who have married is the time that has passed since they 
started their cohabitation, and not the time since marriage. Another important control variable 
is children. Three dummy variables are included in the model in order to capture effects of the 
presence of three types of children in the household: One dummy variable indicates whether 
the couple has any common children, another variable indicates whether the man has children 
from an earlier relationship, and a third variables indicates whether the woman has children 
from earlier relationships (0 = no, 1 = yes).  
 
Statistical approach 
As our main outcome is a binary variable, we use the logistic regression model to model the 
logarithmic odds of the partners pooling their economic resources. This approach is adequate 
for models of binary outcome variables (Menard 1995). Descriptive statistics for all analysis 
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variables are shown in table 1. In order to have a meaningful reference group in the regression 
analysis, the education, income and age variables were centred. The reference group is 
married couples, in the first year of their relationship, where the average age of the partners is 
25, with no children living in the household, both partners‟ education levels at ISCED level 4, 
and both earning average incomes.  
We estimate three separate models. The first model includes only union status, and 
shows what the gross differences in the likelihood of pooling economic resources are for the 
three types of couples we study. In a second model, we include control variables indicating 
the couples socio-economic resources and potential, such as partners‟ average age, education 
levels, and incomes. Then, in a final estimation round, we add controls for several 
characteristics of the couples‟ relationship and household.  
 
ABOUT HERE TABLE 1 
 
RESULTS 
Pooling of resources in cohabiting and married couples 
Our main interest lies with the differences between married and cohabiting couples in 
their likelihood of pooling their economic resources. Evidently, with this cross-sectional 
research design, we do not know whether union type causes different degrees of pooling, or 
whether we are witnessing the result of selection into marriage of couples who pool their 
economic resources. What we can ascertain, however, is whether or not the difference 
between married and cohabiting couples persists when we have introduced our two sets of 
additional variables. 
 
ABOUT HERE TABLE 2 
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From the first model reported in table 2, the basic model without any control variables, 
we see that the association between union type and our outcome is strong and statistically 
significant: In accordance our first hypothesis, married couples are more likely to pool their 
incomes than are cohabiting couples. Both categories of cohabiting couples are less likely to 
pool incomes than married couples. Cohabiting couples without marriage plans are those who 
are the least likely to pool their resources. Couples that are cohabiting but do have specific 
intentions to get married are less likely to pool their resources than married couples, but more 
likely to do so than couples without marriage intentions. Thus, also our second hypothesis is 
supported. The parameters for the two groups of cohabiting couples are statistically different 
from each other (p = XXX) 
These differences persist when we in the second model include our set of 
socioeconomic control variables and age. However, when we also include relationship 
characteristics, we see that the differences between married couples and the two groups of 
cohabiting couples are markedly reduced. Taken together, the relationship characteristics 
must be very important for the management of the couple‟s finances. In turn, we discuss the 
impact of the relationship characteristics: Duration of the couple‟s co-residential relationship, 
the couple‟s common children living in the household, as well as any children the partners 
have from earlier relationships living in the household. 
First, the duration of the union, this variable has the strong positive effect on the odds 
of pooling that we expected. For each year more the union has lasted the odds of pooling 
income increases with about 4 per cent, when all the other independent variables in the model 
are controlled. Experiments were done with dummy variable and polynomial 
parameterizations of the duration variable, but the results did not differ in any important way. 
Thus, there is support for our third hypothesis stating that with increasing duration of their 
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relationship, couples are more likely to pool their economic resources even when other 
characteristics of the relationship are controlled. 
Our fourth hypothesis stated that children serve as an important confounder of the 
relationship between marital status on the one hand and the likelihood of pooling on the other 
hand. The presence of children in the household was also expected to have a positive effect 
on the odds of pooling. It does indeed have such an effect, as the odds for pooling income is 
around 18 per cent higher for couples with children than for the reference group of childless 
couples. Thus, this hypothesis is also supported by the data. It is only the presence of common 
children that has an effect on the likelihood of pooling income. For couples that have children  
either of the partners had in earlier relationships, the effects are statistically insignificant. 
When both duration of the union and presence of children are controlled, the odds of 
pooling for cohabiting couples with and without marriage intentions are reduced to 
respectively 78% and 46% of that off married couples , indicating lower likelihoods of 
pooling in these couples when compared with married couples. Only the difference between 
cohabitants without marriage intentions and married couples and between two types of 
cohabitants were significantly different at the 5% level, however. The finding of different 
degrees of pooling by union status is evidence for our proposition that, in studies of 
differences in behaviour between married couples and cohabiting couples, researchers need to 
take into account which stage the relationship is at. Co-residential relationships have a 
momentum of their own, that produces certain types of behaviours in the partners. 
 
Results for all control variables included in the final model 
There is no statistically significant effect of respondent’s sex. This result means that there is 
no systematic difference between male and female partner‟s concerning the report of income 
pooling within households. Secondly, there is a statistically significant effect of age on the 
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propensity to pool resources. The effect is negative but nonlinear so that the probability for 
pooling resources is much larger for young couples than for older couples. Concerning the 
potential effect of education, only the parameter estimated for his education level was 
statistically significant. A highly educated male partner seems to reduce the likelihood of 
pooling economic resources. The partners‟ annual incomes yielded no significant effects on 
the odds of pooling resources. However, the interaction effect indicates that when both 
partners are earning higher salaries, their likelihood of pooling is reduced.  
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In accordance with earlier research and our theoretical expectations, we are able to show that 
there are marked differences between couples in different union types in the economic 
organisation of the household. First and foremost, married couples are much more likely to 
pool their economic resources than are cohabiting couples. Furthermore, our analysis also 
shows that cohabiting couples that intend to marry are more likely to pool their economic 
resources than cohabiting couples without marriage plans. Most interestingly, these 
differences remain even when the couples are identical with respect to duration of the 
relationship, the presence of children, a set of socioeconomic control variables, and age. All 
these factors could be possible explanations of the relationships between marital status and 
money management. The relationship characteristics do explain some of the gross differences, 
but there are still marked differences in the organisation of money that must be due to other 
mechanisms.  
These results are in line with results from previous studies of pooling using other data 
and other operationalizations, for example the ISSP data sets and Pahl‟s money management 
typology, but did not include measurements of the presence of children and distinguish 
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between his and her income and education. In the absence of the data that include 
measurements of pooling and at the same time these very important demographic variables, 
we view this comparison as an indication that the dependent variable captures the 
phenomenon of pooling versus non-pooling to a satisfactory degree for our purposes. 
 The results indicate that marriage induces on the partners a special way of considering 
their relationship. As a social institution, marriage fills and regulates certain important tasks 
in society. Through the family institution and marriage society regulates emotional affection 
and relations between men and women. It provides a system of legal rights and duties, 
expectations and demands between the two partners but also between parents and children. 
These formal and informal norms concern financial matters such as support and inheritance, 
division of tasks between the members of the family, and socialisation and upbringing of 
children. The family institution offers a basis for stability and predictability and trust, what 
the transactional economics framework would call “reduced transaction costs.” Marriage 
strengthens the ties and the solidarity between the two partners, but the marital institution is 
also rigid, and not necessarily well adapted to changing demands in society. It might reify and 
legitimize unequal distributions of resources and power at both the micro level within each 
family and at the societal level. 
According to the idea of increasing individualisation there is a match between the 
independence and loose ties connected to cohabitation and the market-like way of organising 
income. This could also explain why cohabiting couples with marriage plans behave more 
like married couples in this respect. For many couples, cohabitation is a first step towards 
marriage. Marriage plans imply more commitment and stronger ties that also explain why 
they are more likely to pool money. 
There is a shift towards more equality in heterosexual relationships (Vogler 2005) . 
Nyman (1999) finds for instance in a non-representative sample of ten married Swedish 
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couples that most of the couples expressed a norm of equal sharing, i.e. that they organized 
money in such a way that each of them would have the same amount left to personal 
spending. A high prevalence of the equality norm may, however, have different implications 
for married and cohabiting couples, respectively. Brines and Joyner (1999) find that 
dissolution of a relationship is less likely when there is specialisation of tasks within marriage 
and when there is equal power-sharing within cohabitation. Married and cohabiting couples 
might also define equality in different ways (Vogler 2005). While married couples interpreted 
equality as „jointness‟, cohabitants defined equality as numerically equal contributions to the 
household and an equal sharing of expenses. The two types of couples would have two 
different ways of organising their income, but still claim that the organisation is “equal”. 
Whether couples pool income or keep money separate influences the distribution of 
access to and control over money. The effect of money control systems are however not easily 
predictable. Joint pooling of income may lead to more equal distribution of resources and 
influence but may also maintain and reproduce gender inequalities as long as the male main 
breadwinner model is the norm rather than the exception. The same conclusion is valid for 
independent management systems. The potential „equalising‟ effect of keeping money 
separate depends on how expenses are divided between the partners. If expenses are equally 
divided, the partner who earns less (usually the woman) is contributing relatively more than 
the partner who earns most. If expenses are divided in proportion to income each partner 
contribute „equally‟ according an equity rule but the partner who earns less will still have less 
income left to cover personal expenses. Another alternative is to divide expenses in such a 
way that both partners have the same amount left to personal expenses. The two latter 
arrangements do, however, resemble the regime of income pooling. 
Two other aspects are also important. The first aspect concerns the definition of 
personal and collective expenses. For instance, expenses related to children may not in all 
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cases be defined as collective spending but can fall into a “grey” category, often left to the 
women to pay for (Vogler 2005). Such definitions undermine efforts to obtain a more equal 
distribution of money within couples. Another aspect is the evaluation of housework. If one 
partner spends more time doing housework than the other but has considerably less access and 
control over money this implies that her work effort is valued less than the work effort of the 
husband. 
The fact that more people live as cohabiting couples, a substantial number of children 
have cohabiting parents, and cohabiting couples are less regulated than married couples 
implies that knowledge of potential differences in couples‟ propensity to pool economic 
resources will be valuable to policy-makers. If cohabiting couples organise their income in 
different ways from married couples this may have consequences for the question of equality 
between men and women. Cohabitation may give women more control and power over the 
household income compared to marriage, but the reverse may also be the case. The typical 
way of organising money among cohabiting couples may create, maintain or even aggravate 
gaps in economic resources between the partners. 
Our results show that, even in a context where the legal regulation of unmarried 
cohabitation is increasingly similar to formal marriage, there are important differences in how 
married and cohabiting couples organize their finances. Arguments in favor of legal 
equalization of marriage and cohabitation were in the first decades of widespread cohabitation 
met with resistance from religious groups. Most politicians did, however, realize that treating 
cohabitants like singles may threaten the legitimacy of the welfare state since those living 
alone ordinarily got more than married couples. It  was difficult to determine which of the 
cohabitants that were so marriage-like that they should be treated as married people, and even 
more to agree on practical solutions in identifying these couples without invading the citizens‟ 
right to privacy. In Norway, this resistance has faded as cohabitation has become more 
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common and the definitions and the practice of identifying those cohabiting couples who are 
treated in the same manner as married couples, have been accepted. Suggestions of even 
further convergence in the obligations and rights of cohabitants towards those of married 
couples have, however, lately met increasing skepticism from the opposite side of the aisle, 
those who are inclined to protect the uniqueness of informal cohabitation and individuals‟ 
freedom of choice and autonomy regarding the ways in which they manage their private life. 
This is yet another reminder that one should be careful treating cohabitation and marriage as 
indistinguishable phenomena, even if the former may seem very “marriage-like” in many 
ways. 
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